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Abstract When engaging in social interaction, people
rely on their ability to reason about unobservable men-
tal content of others, which includes goals, intentions,
and beliefs. This so-called theory of mind ability allows
them to more easily understand, predict, and influence
the behavior of others. People even use their theory
of mind to reason about the theory of mind of others,
which allows them to understand sentences like ‘Alice
believes that Bob does not know about the surprise
party’. But while the use of higher orders of theory of
mind is apparent in many social interactions, empirical
evidence so far suggests that people do not use this abil-
ity spontaneously when playing strategic games, even
when doing so would be highly beneficial. In this pa-
per, we attempt to encourage participants to engage in
higher-order theory of mind reasoning by letting them
play a game against computational agents. Since previ-
ous research suggests that competitive games may en-
courage the use of theory of mind, we investigate a par-
ticular competitive game, the Mod game, which can be
seen as a much larger variant of the well-known rock-
paper-scissors game. By using a combination of com-
putational agents and Bayesian model selection, we si-
multaneously determine to what extent people make
use of higher-order theory of mind reasoning, as well
as to what extent computational agents can encourage
the use of higher-order theory of mind in their human
opponents.
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Department of Artificial Intelligence, Bernoulli Institute, Uni-
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Research group User-Centered Design, Hanze University of
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Our results show that participants who play the
Mod game against computational theory of mind agents
adjust their level of theory of mind reasoning to that
of their computer opponent. Earlier experiments with
other strategic games show that participants only en-
gage in low orders of theory of mind reasoning. Sur-
prisingly, we find that participants who knowingly play
against second- and third-order theory of mind agents
apply up to fourth-order theory of mind themselves,
and achieve higher scores as a result.
1 Introduction
Many social skills vitally depend on the ability of the
person to reason about others as goal-oriented agents
with their own beliefs, goals, and intentions, an im-
portant part of social cognition. This ability to reason
explicitly about unobservable mental content of oth-
ers, known as theory of mind [20], has been associated
with pro-social behavior [13], social competences [15],
and negotiation skills [31], as well as in producing and
interpreting prosody [4] and nonverbal communication
through body language and gestures [18,19]. But while
adults show impressive theory of mind abilities in some
experiments that rely on communication, people are
typically slow to take advantage of their theory of mind
ability in strategic settings [11,3,32,10]. In this paper,
we explore the possible use of artificial theory of mind
agents in quantifying and encouraging the use of theory
of mind.
People do not only use their theory of mind to rea-
son about goals, desires, and beliefs concerning world
facts of others. Rather, people are able to use their the-
ory of mind ability recursively, and reason about the
way others make use of theory of mind. For example,
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people make use of second-order theory of mind to un-
derstand a sentence such as “Alice knows that Bob
knows that Carol is throwing him a birthday party”,
by reasoning about what Alice knows about what Bob
knows. In experimental story comprehension tasks, adults
show their impressive ability for recursive theory of
mind ability, and score much better than chance on
questions that explicitly involve fourth-order theory of
mind reasoning [14,23].
In this article, we explore the potential of artificial
agents to train the social skills of human participants.
In particular, we are interested in encouraging people
to spontaneously engage in higher-order theory of mind
reasoning, which is the basis for a variety of social skills.
For example, it has been shown that when children with
autism spectrum disorder are trained with theory of
mind tasks, their social skills improve [1]. To accom-
plish our goal, we formulate the following two research
questions.
1. To what extent do human participants make use
of theory of mind reasoning when playing against
artificial agents?
2. To what extent can interacting with artificial agents
encourage human participants to make use of higher-
order theory of mind reasoning?
To this end, we let participants play the Mod game [9]
against artificial theory of mind agents, and estimate
their level of theory of mind reasoning using random-
effects Bayesian model selection [22].
Studies involving artificial agents with the ability
to reason about the beliefs and goals of others show
that higher-order theory of mind reasoning can be par-
ticularly effective in competitive settings [9,6,7]. Our
previous research on the matching pennies game, how-
ever, shows that in this simple competitive game, many
people rely on simpler, behavior-based strategies when
engaging with artificial agents [27]. A possible cause for
the lack of theory of mind reasoning was that due to
the limited number of possible actions, it is difficult to
distinguish between strategies. For this reason, we con-
sider an extension of the matching pennies game with
more possible actions, known as the Mod game. While
the Mod game has a structure that is very similar to
that of matching pennies, the larger number of possible
actions should make it easier for participants to distin-
guish between strategies. This may help participants to
reason about the goals and beliefs of their opponent,
and encourage them to make use of higher orders of
theory of mind. Moreover, our results from agent simu-
lations in variants of the Mod game suggest that both
first-order and second-order theory of mind can greatly
benefit players, while the use of orders of theory of mind
beyond the second hardly provides additional benefits
[30,28].
In this Mod game setting, we let human partici-
pants play against virtual agents that we previously
developed to determine the effectiveness of making use
of increasingly higher orders of theory of mind [29]. By
making use of artificial agents, we can precisely control
and monitor the mental content of the opponents that
participants face, including their application of theory
of mind. This allows us to analyze and diagnose par-
ticipant data from a more controlled setting, as well
as ensure that participants play against an opponent
that reasons at a particular level of theory of mind.
The agents therefore provide us with a tool to diag-
nose human behavior (cf. research question 1). An ad-
ditional benefit of using virtual agents is that by letting
human participants train with virtual agents that are
programmed to reason in a certain fashion, we can po-
tentially expose participants to a level of theory of mind
reasoning that would stimulate them to improve their
own reasoning (cf. research question 2). For example,
a participant who plays against a second-order theory
of mind agent might recognize the reasoning strategy
and apply third-order theory of mind to outsmart this
tough opponent. Unlike human opponents, the agent is
consistent in its use of theory of mind, which may make
it easier for the participant to recognize the benefit of
higher-order theory of mind reasoning.
As far as we know, explicit higher-order theory of
mind training has not yet been part of virtual training
agents for social skills, although some authors mention
its possible usefulness for contexts in which deception
plays a role [2,16].
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 introduces an analyzes the Mod game, while
and Section 3 describes a range of strategies that agents
and humans could use in this setting. In Section 4,
we describe a method to gauge agents’ and partici-
pants’ reasoning strategies from their behavior known
as random-effects Bayesian model selection. Section 5
delineates our experiment in which human participants
played the Mod game against agents that used different
orders of theory of mind. The results of this experiment
are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the ar-
ticle and describes how virtual agents can indeed be
used to support people in using higher orders of theory
of mind in a competitive game such as the Mod game.
A preliminary version of this research was presented at
BNAIC 2017 [24].
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Fig. 1: Histograms over 24 choices, rates, and accelerations of human behaviour in the Mod game. In each graph,
the blue curve shows the expected results from random behaviour, while the red curve shows the participant
behaviour (reconstructed from [8]).
2 Mod Game
The Mod game is an n-player generalization of rock-
paper-scissors, introduced by Frey and Goldstone [9] as
a way to reveal patterns in individual theory of mind
strategies. The Mod game is played by n players, who si-
multaneously choose a number in the range {1, . . . ,m},
with m > n > 1. For every opponent that has chosen
the number that is exactly one lower than their own
choice, players gain one point. For example, a player
that has chosen the number 4 gains a point for every
opponent that has chosen number 3. The only exception
to this rule is that players that have chosen number 1
gain one point for every player that has chosen number
m. That is, the name ‘mod’ game refers to the goal of
players to choose the number that is ‘+1 mod m’ the
number of their opponent(s). In our experiment, we vi-
sualize the rules of the game to human participants by
arranging actions in a circle (see Figure 2 for m = 24).
Each action in the Mod game is dominated by some
other action, similar to games such as rock-paper-scissors.
In fact, the Mod game is equivalent to a non-zero-sum
version of rock-paper-scissors for n = 2 andm = 3. Sim-
ilar to rock-paper-scissors, the Mod game has a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium in which each action is cho-
sen with equal probability. That is, when all players
play according to this randomizing strategy, none of the
players has an incentive to change his or her strategy.
However, it is unlikely that a group of human par-
ticipants would play according to this Nash equilib-
rium. Experimental evidence has shown that human
participants are generally poor at generating random
sequences [12,21,26]. This suggests that in groups of
people, it is likely that at least one person will devi-
ate from playing the Nash equilibrium strategy. But
if some player i deviates from this randomizing strat-
egy, then all other players have an incentive to deviate
from random play as well. After all, each player can in-
crease their expected payoff by adjusting their strategy
to take advantage of the predictability in the behavior
of player i. With human players, social skills therefore
play a role in the Mod game, because the person who
can predict the beliefs and actions of others most accu-
rately achieves the highest score.
Participant behavior in repeated Mod games indeed
deviates from the Nash equilibrium, as depicted in Fig-
ure 1 (reconstructed from [8]). The figure shows exper-
imental data for the Mod game with 24 actions, includ-
ing the proportion of times a given number was chosen
(red line in left graph) and the idealized randomizing
behavior (blue line) across participants over 100 rounds
of play. Participant choices (red line in left-most graph)
appear to be approximately random, with a slight bias
towards 24. However, a clear deviation from the Nash
equilibrium is shown when the previous choice of a par-
ticipant is considered. The middle graph in Figure 1
depicts participant rates, which is defined as the differ-
ence in choice between two subsequent rounds. As the
figure shows, participants (red line in the middle graph)
are most likely to choose a number that is 0 to 4 higher
than their previous choice, while they are very unlikely
to select numbers that are 7 to 21 ahead of their previ-
ous choice. If participants were to play according to the
Nash equilibrium, however, each rate should be equally
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likely (blue line). Participant acceleration, which is de-
fined as the change in participant rate, shows a similar
effect. Figure 1 (red line in right-most graph) shows that
participants tend to vary little in their rate. That is, a
participant who chose a number in the last round that
was 2 higher than the number in the round before that
is mostly likely to choose the number that is 2 higher in
the current round than his choice in the previous round.
In addition, Figure 1 also shows that participants that
vary their acceleration do so by a small amount. Again,
Nash equilibrium play would result in each acceleration
being equally likely (blue line).
Frey and Goldstone [8] show that these deviations
from the Nash equilibrium strategy are not due to par-
ticipants’ poor performance on choosing random ac-
tions. When participants are given the option to let
the computer select a randomly generated action, this
option is used little [8]. This suggests that participants
believe that they can accurately predict the actions of
others, and act on this belief by choosing a number
rather than going for the randomizing option. That is,
participants may rely on social cognition when playing
this game.
In our current experiment, participants play a spe-
cific variant of the Mod game with m = 24 actions and
n = 2 players. For the remainder of the paper, we will
only consider this specific variant of the Mod game.
3 Strategies in the Mod game
The Mod game, as outlined in Section 2, can be played
using a variety of strategies. In this section, we describe
a number of these strategies. These include strategies
based on the use of theory of mind, as well as sim-
ple behavior-based strategies. Table 1 shows Mod game
strategies we consider in this research. In addition to
the theory of mind strategies, which are the main focus
of our research, we consider several simpler, behavior-
based strategies that rely purely on the actions observed
in the previous round of play, as suggested by the re-
sults depicted in Figure 1.
In this section, we describe these strategies in detail.
To avoid confusion, in the remainder, we will refer to
focal agents as if they were male, while we will refer to
their opponents as if they were female.
3.1 Behavior-based strategies
While participants may benefit from reasoning about
the beliefs and goals of others while playing the Mod
game, the game can be played without relying on such
Table 1: We consider eight possible strategies for
playing the Mod game, including four behavior-based










strategies. In our Bayesian RFX-BMS analysis of par-
ticipant behavior, we therefore consider a number of
behavior-based strategies. A player that uses a behavior-
based strategy responds to actions observed in previous
rounds of play only.
3.1.1 Self-regarding strategy
An agent that follows a self-regarding strategy ignores
the actions of the opponent, and decides what action
to take based on what action he has performed in the
previous round. The self-regarding strategy depends on
two free parameters. The drift parameter k determines
the change in action in every round, so that an agent
that follows a self-regarding strategy with drift k tends
to choose the number that is k higher (modulo 24) than
the action he performed in the previous round.
The choice probability p determines the strength of
this self-regarding tendency. For example, an agent that
follows a self-regarding strategy with k = 2 selects the
action that is 2 higher than his previous choice with
probability p, while each other action has a probability
1
23 (1− p) of being selected.
3.1.2 Other-regarding strategy
The other-regarding strategy is similar to the self-regarding
strategy, except that an agent that follows the other-
regarding strategy reacts to the previous action of his
opponent rather than his own previous action. Like the
self-regarding strategy, the other-regarding strategy re-
lies on a drift parameter k and choice probability p.
An agent that follows an other-regarding strategy with
drift k selects the action that is exactly k higher (mod-
ulo 24) than his opponent’s action in the previous round
with probability p. Each other action is selected with
probability 123 (1− p).
Note that if an agent plays according to an other-
regarding strategy with k = 1, the agent tends to play
the action that would have won in the previous round.
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3.1.3 Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (WSLS) strategy
An agent that follows the win-stay, lose-shift (WSLS)
strategy bases his current decision on the outcome of
the previous round. If the agent won the previous round,
he will repeat his previously chosen action with prob-
ability p, while each of the other 23 actions is selected
with probability 123 (1 − p). However, if the agent did
not win the previous round, he will repeat his previ-
ously chosen action with probability 1 − p, while each
of the other 23 actions is selected with probability p/23.
The single parameter p is a free parameter.
3.2 Theory of mind strategies
In addition to the behavior-based strategies described
above, our analysis includes strategies that are based on
taking advantage of social cognition while playing the
Mod game. These strategies are inspired by the theory
of mind agents that we introduced to investigate the
effectiveness of theory of mind in competitive settings
[30]. A theory of mind agent can take the perspective of
other agents, a skill that lies at the root of many social
skills. By determining what the agent would do him-
self if he were facing the situation of an opponent and
attributing this thought process to that opponent, the
theory of mind agent can formulate a prediction of the
behavior of other players. Additional orders of theory
of mind allow the agent to generate additional hypothe-
ses of opponent behavior. The task of a theory of mind
agent is then to determine which hypothesis yields the
most accurate predictions. Below, we briefly describe
these agents. A full mathematical model of these agents
can be found in [30].
3.2.1 Zero-order theory of mind
A zero-order theory of mind (ToM0) agent has no the-
ory of mind at all, and is therefore unable to attribute
mental content to others. In particular, a ToM0 agent
cannot consider his opponent as a goal-directed agent
who is trying to obtain a high score for herself. Instead,
the ToM0 agent forms zero-order beliefs about the ac-
tions the opponent will play in future rounds of the
game based on her behavior in the past.
In our agent model, a ToM0 agent forms beliefs b
(0)
about the actions of the opponent. For each number
i = 1, . . . , 24, the ToM0 agent has a belief b
(0)(i) that
represents what he believes to be the likelihood that his
opponent will select to play that number. Given these
beliefs, the ToM0 agent can calculate the expected value
EV (0)(i; b(0)) of choosing number i. Note that in the
case of the Mod game, the expected value of choosing
number i is the belief that the opponent will choose the
action i− 1 (modulo 24). That is,
EV (0)(i; b(0)) = n · b(0)
(
(i− 1) mod 24
)
. (1)
The ToM0 agent acts on these beliefs by choosing the
number that maximizes his score. For example, if a
ToM0 agent strongly believes that number 4 will be
selected by his opponent, the agent should choose to
play number 5 himself.
After every round, the ToM0 agent updates his zero-
order beliefs to reflect the actual outcome. An agent-
specific learning speed λ ∈ [0, 1] determines the rela-
tive influence of the current observation on the agent’s
beliefs. For example, a ToM0 agent with zero learning
speed (λ = 0) does not update his beliefs at all. Such an
agent selects the same action in every round. A ToM0
agent with the maximal learning speed (λ = 1), on the
other hand, completely replaces his zero-order beliefs
after each observation, and forgets all information ob-
tained from previous rounds. Such an agent considers
the observed actions of the last round as the best pre-
dictor for the future1.
To account for small deviations between participant
choices and the ToM0 agent strategy, we make use of
the so-called ‘softmax’ probabilistic policy [5,27]. That
is, in addition to the learning speed λ, the ToM0 agent
strategy has an additional parameter β that controls
the magnitude of behavioral noise, so that the proba-
bility that a ToM0 agent chooses number i is










As a result, the ToM0 strategy has two free parameters:
the behavioral noise parameter β and the learning speed
λ.
3.3 First-order theory of mind
Unlike the ToM0 agent, a first-order theory of mind
(ToM1) agent is capable of reasoning about the goals
of others, and believes that his opponent may be trying
to maximize her score. To predict the behavior of his
opponent, the ToM1 agent attributes his own thought
process to her. A ToM1 agent therefore considers the
possibility that his opponent is a goal-directed agent
like he is, and that while the agent reacts to the actions
of his opponent, the opponent is reacting to the actions
of the agent.
1 Note that a ToM0 agent with learning speed λ = 1 be-
haves identically to an other-regarding agent with k = 1.
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Following our theory of mind models of [30], the
ToM1 agent does not attempt to model the learning
speed λ for his first-order model of opponent behavior.
Instead, the ToM1 agent assumes that his opponent has
the same learning speed as he has himself.
Although the ToM1 agent models his opponent as
being able to use zero-order theory of mind, agents in
our setup do not know the extent of the abilities of
their opponent for certain. Rather, a ToM1 agent has
two models of opponent behavior, one based on zero-
order theory of mind and one on first-order theory of
mind. Each of these models makes a prediction of the
opponent’s behavior. In addition, the ToM1 agent has
a confidence parameter c1 (0 ≤ c1 ≤ 1) that determines
to what extent the agent’s behavior is determined by
first-order theory of mind reasoning. After each obser-
vation of the opponent’s action aj , this confidence is
updated according to the following rule:
c1 :=
{
(1− λ) · c1 + λ if ao = â(1)o ,
(1− λ) · c1 otherwise,
where â
(1)
o is the first-order theory of mind prediction
of the action of the opponent.
Through repeated interaction, a ToM1 agent learns
which of his models best describes the behavior of his
opponent. Based on this information, a ToM1 agent
may therefore choose to play as if he were a ToM0 agent,
and ignore the predictions of his first-order theory of
mind.
To account for behavioral noise, we apply a soft-
max policy to the actions prescribed by the ToM1 agent
strategy as well. However, this policy is applied only to
the actions of the ToM1 agent. The agent does not ap-
ply this policy in its model of opponent behavior. Al-
though the ToM1 strategy is more complex than the
ToM0 strategy, both strategies rely on the same two
free parameters, namely behavioral noise β and learning
speed λ. That is, the ToM1 strategy does not introduce
any additional free parameters.
3.4 Higher orders of theory of mind
For each additional order of theory of mind k, an agent
generates an additional prediction of opponent behav-
ior, by attributing his own (k−1)st-order theory of mind
thought process to his opponent. For example, a ToM2
agent models his opponents as ToM1 agents, in addition
to his zero-order and first-order theory of mind models
of opponent behavior. As a result, a ToMk agent has
k + 1 hypotheses for the action that will be chosen by
his opponent, with corresponding predictions. Based on
the accuracy of these predictions, the ToMk agent can
therefore choose to behave according to k + 1 patterns
of behavior.
As described for the ToM1 strategy, we apply a soft-
max policy to account for behavioral noise, which is
applied only to the action that a focal ToMk agent per-
forms. In particular, the softmax policy is not applied
to any of the ToMk agent’s models of opponent behav-
ior. Also, while each additional order of theory of mind
provides an agent with an additional prediction of op-
ponent behavior, no additional parameters are intro-
duced. That is, each theory of mind strategy is defined
by its behavioral noise parameter β and learning speed
λ.
4 Random-effects Bayesian model selection
In this paper, we attempt to encourage participants in
their use of social cognition through interactions with
artificial theory of mind agents. To determine what
level of theory of mind reasoning a participant is en-
gaging in at different points throughout the experi-
ment, we make use of a technique known as group-level
random-effects Bayesian model selection (RFX-BMS),
introduced by Stephan and colleagues [22]. Whereas
fixed-effects Bayesian model selection assumes that the
actions of all participants can be best described by a
single strategy, random-effects Bayesian model selec-
tion allows for individual differences in strategy selec-
tion. Strategies are treated as random effects that occur
with an unknown but fixed probability in the popula-
tion. A group of participants represents a random sam-
ple drawn from these strategies.
Random-effects Bayesian model selection estimates
what distribution of strategies best fits the experimen-
tal data. Each strategy s generates pieces of evidence
p(yi|s) representing the probability that choosing ac-
tions according to strategy s will result in some ob-
served data yi of participant i. Fixed-effects Bayesian
model selection aims to identify the strategy s that has
maximal evidence
∏
i p(yi|s) across all participants i.
That is, fixed-effects Bayesian model selection assumes
that there is a single strategy that explains the behavior
of all participants.
In contrast, random-effects Bayesian model selec-
tion aims to identify the distribution of strategies in
the population. That is, it aims to identify the relative
frequencies fs of strategies s with
∑
s fs = 1 so that
evidence fs ·
∏
i p(yi|s)) is maximized.
To determine to what extent a participant makes
use of theory of mind while playing the Mod game, we
compare the observed behavior yi of each participant
i with the predicted behavior of computational agents
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following the strategies described in Section 3. That is,
the model evidence p(yi|s) generated by a given strat-
egy model s is the probability that following strategy s
will result in the same behavior yi as participant i.
The combination of our theory of mind agents with
RFX-BMS has been previously used by us in [27] to
accurately recover the level of theory of mind reason-
ing of Devaine’s Bayesian theory of mind agents [5].
This indicates that this method can overcome some of
the biases in the designer’s choice of how to implement
theory of mind. After all, the agents of one designer ac-
curately modeled the theory of mind abilities of other,
independently designed theory of mind agents.
5 Experimental Setup
To determine whether interacting with artificial theory
of mind agents encourages the use of theory of mind,
we let human participants play the Mod game against
artificial theory of mind agents. Participants played the
two-player Mod game with 24 actions, as described in
Section 2.
5.1 Participants
Sixteen participants were included in this study, of which
eight were male and eight were female, all students and
all over the age of 18 (M = 21.5, SD = 2.3). The exper-
iment was conducted in English, and all participants
were sufficiently skilled in reading and understanding
the English language, as they were all students of the
University of Groningen, where an admission require-
ment is a sufficient proficiency in the English language.
Before starting with the experiment, all participants
gave informed consent about partaking and about the
use of the data obtained by the experiment for the pur-
pose of this study.
5.2 Experimental design
Each participant played the Mod game against four
different computer opponents: a ToM1 agent, a ToM2
agent, a ToM3 agent, and an agent whose order was
randomized each round. This randomizing agent would
randomly select to respond as if it were a first-order,
second-order, or third-order theory of mind agent in
each round. That is, during a block of twenty rounds,
the randomizing agent would randomly select a rea-
soning strategy twenty times. The ToM agents in the
experiment did not exhibit any behavioral noise (i.e.
β → 0+) and were set to learning speed λ = 0.5.
Note that participants never played against a ToM0
agent. During a separate pilot study, it was discovered
that ToM0 agents and ToM1 agents exhibit the same
behavior when playing the Mod game against a human
participant. The ToM0 agent believes that the best pre-
dictor for a participant’s future behavior is the partic-
ipant’s behavior in the most recent round. As a result,
the ToM0 agent tends to select the number that is 1
higher than the number last chosen by the participant.
The ToM1 agent, on the other hand, believes that
the opponent wants to win the game. By taking the per-
spective of the opponent, the ToM1 agent believes that
the opponent will choose the number that is 1 higher
than his own last choice. For example, suppose that the
agent chose 23 in the last round and the participant
played 24. In this case, the ToM1 agent believes that
the opponent is going to play 24 again, since the ToM1
agent believes that the participant is a ToM0 agent who
believes that the agent is going to play 23 again. Follow-
ing this reasoning, the agent decides to play 1, which is
exactly 1 higher than the participant’s previous choice
(24).
Whenever the participant wins from the agent, the
participant has chosen the number that is 1 higher than
the number chosen by the agent. In this case, the be-
havior of a ToM0 agent (choose the number that is 1
higher than the participant’s last choice) is the same
as that of a ToM1 agent (choose the number that is 2
higher than the agent’s own last choice). In both cases,
the agent chooses to play the number that is 1 higher
than the participant’s previous choice. When the par-
ticipant wins consistently, the behavior of a ToM1 agent
is therefore almost indistinguishable from the behavior
of a ToM0 agent. Due to this effect, we decided not to
include the ToM0 agent in our experiment.
Each block consisted of twenty rounds of the Mod
game, in which participants played against the same
opponent for all twenty rounds. Between blocks, the
opponent was changed to a ToM agent of a different or-
der. The order in which participants faced the different
opponents was randomly drawn from four possible se-
quences: [?,1,2,3]; [3,?,1,2]; [2,1,3,?]; and [1,?,3,2], where
the question mark (?) represents a randomizing agent,
whose order of theory of mind reasoning was random-
ized each round. The different sequences were chosen to
rule out the effect of sequence on the performance. Par-
ticipants were informed about the ToM order of the op-
ponent they were playing against, except in the blocks
in which they faced the randomizing agent. During the
rounds against the randomizing agent, the order of the
opponent was not shown to the participants, in order
to see if the participants’ behavior also changed if the
ToM order of the opponent was not known. By inform-
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ing the participants, we not only aimed to inform the
participants that they were playing against an intelli-
gent opponent, but also to entice them to think about
their choices and strategy.
Each participant played two repetitions of four blocks,
so that in total, a participant played forty rounds of
the Mod game against each opponent. The sequence
did not change within participants, so a participant
faced a certain sequence of agents twice. A certain op-
ponent was played against for twenty rounds before
the agent’s ToM order changed. The number of twenty
rounds per opponent was chosen because people typi-
cally need many trials before showing higher-order rea-
soning behavior [10].
Fig. 2: Interface of the Mod24 Game experiment.
5.3 Procedure and materials
The experiment was run entirely on a MacBook. Since
the experiment was web-based, only a browser (Google
Chrome) was used. First, the participants read some
short information about the theory of mind and the dif-
ferent orders that were used in this experiment (ToM1,
ToM2, and ToM3). Note that while this procedure may
have primed participants to make use of theory of mind
strategies, evidence from Marble Drop experiments shows
that even in this case, participants may have difficul-
ties implementing higher-order theory of mind strate-
gies [11,17]. Participants then read an explanation of
the experiment itself, including the rules of the Mod
game and an explanation of the interface. Before the ex-
perimental rounds started, the participants completed
three test rounds to confirm they understood the inter-
face. As the participants started with the experimental
trials, they saw an interface with twenty-four buttons,
numbered from 1 to 24, placed in a circle (see Figure 2).
The placement of the buttons was constant throughout
the whole experiment. The interface also showed what
level of theory of mind the agent used (except during
the randomizing agent blocks). The participants could
also see how many rounds they had already played, how
many rounds they would play against the same oppo-
nent, the current score of both players, and the chosen
actions of both players in the previous round of play.
At the end of each block, participants were informed
that they would continue playing against a new oppo-
nent. After four blocks, participants could take a break
before continuing with the next four blocks. Once all
eight blocks were finished, another pop-up was shown,
informing the participants that the experiment was fin-
ished. Upon finishing the experiment, the participants
were thanked for their cooperation and received pay-
ment. Each participant was equally compensated for
their effort: the reward was not dependent on the points
obtained during the experiment.
5.4 Data collection
During the experiment, the following variables were
recorded. The reaction time (the time it took the par-
ticipant to choose a number), the number chosen by
the participant, and the number chosen by the agent in
the current round. We also recorded the number cho-
sen by the participant and the agent in the previous
round; this was done to see whether or not there exists
a relation between what the opponent chose previously
and what the participant does next (and vice versa).
The ToM order of the agent was also kept track of, as
well as the number of wins for the participant, and the
number that the participant chose that led to a win.
The data obtained was divided into groups per op-
ponent and the differences in data between these groups
were compared. Variations in rate (differences between
the players’ previous and current number) were com-
pared to see if there was a correlation between the ToM
order of the opponent and the rates the players used.
These differences could indicate that participant behav-
ior changed per opponent.
To investigate this further, an estimate was made
about how likely it was that the participant data corre-
sponded to certain pre-defined strategies. On these like-
lihoods, a random-effect Bayesian model selection (see
Section 4) analysis was executed to determine which
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part of the population used a certain strategy. The
RFX-BMS was executed over the participant data of
the whole experiment, as well as over the participant
data per different ToM opponent. This was done to see
whether the strategies that were used by the partici-
pants varied between the different opponents.
6 Experiment results
6.1 Agent behavior
Figure 3 shows the estimated strategies of each of the
four agents in our experiment. Note that for the ToM1,
ToM2, and ToM3 agents, the RFX-BMS estimation cor-
rectly classifies agent behavior as consistent with the
corresponding order of theory of mind reasoning. More-
over, the randomizing agent is classified as using a strat-
egy that is approximately equally consistent with all
strategies. This shows that the RFX-BMS estimation
can accurately distinguish different order of theory of
mind reasoning, and also considers the randomizing
agent to be unpredictable.
In particular, Figure 3 shows that, although it is
possible for a higher-order theory of mind agent to be-
have as if it were a lower-order theory of mind agent,
such agents are not underestimated by RFX-BMS es-
timation. This means that for each agent, there are
rounds in which the actions of the agent are very un-
likely to be a result of reasoning at a lower order of
theory of mind, which prevents underestimation of the
agent. At the same time, the abilities of the random-
izing agent are not overestimated as being consistent
with third-order or fourth-order theory of mind.
Figure 4 shows the number of wins for each of the ar-
tificial ToM opponents, out of a possible 20. Note that
in each round, exactly one out of 24 possible actions
gives a score of 1. All other actions give a score of 0. As
a result, chance level performance of a given round is 124 .
Across 20 rounds, chance level performance is therefore
20
24 . As the figure shows, the ToM1 agent performed es-
pecially poorly against the human participants, and ob-
tained a median score of 0/20. The random order ToM
agent performed better with a median score of 1/20.
However, only the ToM2 agent (median score of 3/20)
and the ToM3 agent (median score of 2/20) scored sig-
nificantly higher than chance performance (sign test:
p̂ = 0.9375, p < 0.006 and p̂ = 1, p < 0.001, respec-
tively), against a human opponent.
6.2 Human behavior
In this section the results of the experiment are dis-
cussed, with a focus on how the participants reacted to
the artificial ToM agents.
6.2.1 Overall results
In this section, the results of our experiment as a whole
are discussed, aggregated over the different ToM orders
of the opponent. As discussed in Section 5, participants
played the Mod game against four agents with varying
orders of ToM reasoning.
In order to test whether or not a certain sequence
of opponent appearance was harder or easier than any
of the other sequences, an ANOVA was executed over
the participant scores per sequence. No significant in-
fluence of the sequence on the participant scores was
found (F (3, 60) = 0.598, p = 0.616). That is, there is no
reason to believe that the sequence in which the agents
appeared affected the performance of the participants
in any way. In the remainder, we therefore present re-
sults that are aggregated across the different sequences.
The overall behavior of the participants during the
experiment is depicted in Figure 5. Figure 5a shows
the frequencies of the numbers chosen by the partici-
pants (red line) and what the frequencies of the par-
ticipants’ choices would have been if they behaved ran-
domly (green line). This figure shows that there was
no clear preference for certain numbers, meaning that
the participants behaved in an approximately random
fashion. In addition, Figure 5b shows the rate, which
is the difference between the participant’s current and
previous choice. For example, a rate of 3 means that the
participant chose a number that was 3 higher than the
number she previously chose. Figure 5b indicates that
a rate of 2 is chosen the most over the course of the
whole experiment. Overall, participant rates typically
were between 0 and 5. All in all, this means that par-
ticipants mostly chose a number that was two higher
than their previous choice, and sometimes picked the
same number they chose previously, or a number that
was 1, 3, 4, or 5 higher than their previous choice.
6.2.2 Performance and reaction times
Figure 6 shows the performance of the participants per
order of theory of mind of the opponent as the total
number of wins. Since each participant played against
the same opponent twice, each participant represents
two data points in Figure 6.
The figure suggests that participants could relatively
easily win from the ToM1 opponent, while it was harder
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Fig. 3: Estimated strategies of the artificial ToM agents in the experiment.
















Fig. 4: Number of wins for each of the artificial ToM
opponents.
to win from the higher-order theory of mind opponents,
and almost impossible for the participants to win from
the random order ToM opponent. A ToM1 opponent
leads to a relatively high number of wins, with a me-
dian participant score of 16/20. As the order of the-
ory of mind of the opponent increases, the score of the
participant decreases. Against a ToM2 opponent, par-
ticipants score a median 5 out of 20 points, while they
only obtain 3 out of 20 points when facing a ToM3
opponent. The lowest performance was observed when
the participants played against the random order ToM
opponent, where participants achieved a median score
of 1/20. In fact, when playing against the random or-
der ToM agent, participants did not achieve scores that
were significantly higher than chance level performance
(p̂ = 0.6875, p = 0.415).
The influence of the ToM order of the opponent
on the performance of the participants was found to
be significant (F (3, 60) = 66.34, p = 2.2e−16). Further
testing showed that the success rate during the ToM1
blocks was significantly higher than during any of the
other blocks (p = 2.2e−16, p = 2.2e−16 and p = 2.2e−16
for the ToM2, ToM3, and random order ToM blocks
respectively). In addition, participants scored signifi-
cantly higher when facing a ToM2 agent or a ToM3
agent than when they played against the randomizing
agent (p = 5.651e−12 and p = 3.953e−13, respectively).
However, participants’ scores against the ToM2 agent
did not differ significantly from those against the ToM3
agent (p = 0.7258).
Whether or not the reaction times of the partici-
pants differed per opponent was also investigated. It
was hypothesized that participants that engaged in in-
creasingly higher orders of theory of mind reasoning
would also have increasingly longer the reaction times,
e.g. reasoning in ToM2 might take longer than reason-
ing in ToM1. As the level of reasoning of the opponent
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 5: Participant (a) choices and (b) rates during the
whole experiment. The green line indicates the expected
outcome of random behavior.
increases, ideally the level of reasoning of the partici-
pant increases as well, which may result in incrementing
reaction times. To test this, an ANOVA was executed
over the logarithmic reaction time data2 of the partici-
pants, which are depicted in Figure 7.
With p < 2e−16 and F (3, 2556) = 34.85 we found
statistical evidence that the order of the opponent did
influence the reaction times of the participants. This
means that the reaction times of the participants can
differ significantly per opponent. Post-hoc analysis was
performed to see where the differences in reaction times
per opponent lie. The analysis showed that every pair
differed significantly, which indicates that no matter
which opponents are compared, the reaction times of
the participants differed in all conditions significantly
from the other conditions.
The average reaction times of the participants when
playing against a ToM1 agent was 3693 ms, the ToM1
2 The logarithmic transform was used due to the skewed
distribution of reaction times.
Fig. 6: Number of wins for the participant per ToM
order of the opponent.
Fig. 7: Reaction times of the participant per ToM order
of the opponent on a logarithmic scale.
agent was also the opponent that led to the quickest
reactions. The overall reaction times during the trials
against a second-order ToM opponent were longer than
during the trials against a first-order ToM opponent
with an average reaction time of 5653 ms vs. 3693 ms.
During the ToM2 opponent trials, more outliers were
observed, and the maximum and minimum reaction
times were more scattered than in the trials against
a ToM1 agent.
The reaction times when playing against a ToM3
opponent were even more scattered and many outliers
were observed during these trials. The average reaction
time of the participants whilst playing against this op-
ponent was 6684 ms, which is longer than the average
reaction time during the ToM1 trials, but seems close
to the average of the trials against the ToM2 opponent.
The average response time of the participants dur-
ing the trials when the random order ToM agent was
the opponent was 4836 ms, which is smaller than the
reaction times during the ToM2 and ToM3 agent tri-
als, but more than the response times during the ToM1
opponent trials.
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(b)
Fig. 8: Participant (a) choices and (b) rates during the
ToM1 opponent blocks. The green line indicates the ex-
pected outcome of random behavior.
6.2.3 ToM1 opponent
In this section the results will be discussed that were
obtained when the participants played against a ToM1
opponent. The behavior of the participants can be seen
in Figure 8. As can be seen in Figure 8a, participants
favored even numbers over odd numbers when playing
against a ToM1 agent. They did not behave randomly,
the red line (participant behavior) deviates from the
green line (random behavior). Figure 8b shows the fre-
quencies of different rates chosen by the participants.
A rate of 2 was used the most when playing against a
ToM1 agent, this means that participants mostly chose
a number that was 2 higher than their previous choice.
The rate usage of the participants was investigated fur-
ther, by looking at what rate each individual chose the
most out of the trials played against a ToM1 opponent.
Every one of the 16 participants chose a rate of 2 most
often during these trials. This finding seems to be in ac-
cordance with the aggregated frequency rates, observed
in Figure 8b.
Compared to the behavior during the whole experi-
ment (see Figure 5b), it can be seen that the rates when
playing against a ToM1 agent vary less. In the overall
data, more spikes were observed, which is not observed
here. Furthermore, the gradient of the rate figure when
playing against a ToM1 opponent also differs in com-
parison with the rate gradient of the whole experiment.
There is also a larger difference in frequencies with re-
gard to the preferred and ill-favored numbers.
According to the RFX-BMS (green bars in Figure 12),
when playing against a ToM1 agent, an estimated 25.8%
of the participants made use of a ToM2 strategy, while
another estimated 22.4% of the participants used first-
order theory of mind. It seems that the ToM2 strategy
was the best strategy (according to the participants).
This also makes sense in relation to the theory, if you
want to win a ToM game, it is most beneficial to think
exactly one step further than your opponent does, so
think in the second-order if the opponent thinks in the
first-order. However, against a ToM1 agent, a partic-
ipant may also win using first-order theory of mind.
Once the ToM1 agent has lost all confidence in her first-
order theory of mind, she will behave as if she were a
ToM0 agent. After this point, a participant using first-
order theory of mind will win all future rounds.
Note that Figure 8b shows that participants often
chose to play the number that was 2 higher than their
previous choice, which suggests that participants may
have used a self-regarding strategy with k = 2. How-
ever, the RFX-BMS results in Figure 12 show that par-
ticipants were poorly described as using a self-regarding
strategy. This is because the self-regarding strategy with
k = 2 predicts that whenever a player fails to choose
the number that was 2 higher than his previous choice,
he will randomly choose one of the remaining numbers.
The theory of mind strategies, on the other hand, pre-
dict that this player will choose a number that is slightly
higher than either his own previously chosen number or
is slightly higher than the previous choice of the oppo-
nent. Our RFX-BMS results suggest that the latter fits
participant behavior better.
6.2.4 ToM2 opponent
The participant behavior for the rounds against a ToM2
agent can be seen in Figure 9. The red line in Fig-
ure 9a shows that the participants had no clear prefer-
ence for certain numbers during these rounds. As is in-
dicated by the small deviation of participant behavior
(red line) from random behavior (green line), partici-
pant choices were approximately randomly distributed.
Figure 9b shows the rate frequencies during the ToM2
opponent rounds. During these rounds, a rate of 2 oc-
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Fig. 9: Participant (a) choices and (b) rates during the
ToM2 opponent blocks. The green line indicates the ex-
pected outcome of random behavior.
curred the most, however, in Figure 9b it can also be
seen that rates 3 and 4 occurred quite often as well.
When the participants played against the ToM1 agent,
each of the 16 participants chose a rate of 2 most of-
ten, while during the trials against a ToM2 agent, other
rates than just 2 were chosen most often by some of the
participants as well. When playing against a ToM2 op-
ponent, the most chosen rate per participant is still 2,
however, some participants also chose a rate of 1, 3, or
4 the most.
When playing against a ToM2 agent, participants
mainly played according to first-order, second-order, or
third-order theory of mind (blue bars in Figure 12).
Herein a difference with the strategy for the ToM1 op-
ponent can be seen. The difference in ToM order of the
opponent led to a different strategy that occurred the
most in the population.
The results discussed in this section, combined with
the results discussed in Section 6.2.1 indicate a dif-
ference in behavior of the participants per opponent,
mainly in rate and in performance. In comparison with
the rounds played against a ToM1 agent, we also see
differences in strategies that explain the population the
best. This indicates that the opponent against which
participants are playing does influence their behavior
and strategy.
6.2.5 ToM3 opponent
The participant behavior that was observed during the
rounds played against a third-order ToM opponent can
be found in Figure 10. The frequencies of the numbers
chosen by the participants are shown in Figure 10a.
This figure shows that the participant behavior (red
line) again deviates from random behavior (green line),
but overall the participants’ behavior is approximately
random.
The rate with which participants changed their ac-
tion during the ToM3 rounds can be seen in Figure 10b.
The rates that are chosen the most frequent are the
same as when the participants played against a ToM2
agent, namely rates of 1, 2, 3, and 4. However, during
the ToM3 opponent rounds, it seemed that a rate of
4 was chosen more often than during the second-order
ToM opponent rounds. These differences are more clear
when looking at the individual preferences of the partic-
ipants and what rate each participant chose the most.
It was found that when playing against a ToM3 oppo-
nent, a rate of 4 was chosen the most by the largest
part of the population, whereas when playing against a
ToM2 agent, the majority of the participants still chose
a rate of 2 the most. This indicates that while a rate
of 2 occurred the most during these trials overall, when
looking at the most chosen rate per participant a rate of
4 is chosen the most. This means that during the ToM3
opponent trials, some participants might have had a
strategy that entailed choosing a number that was 4
higher than their previous choice.
The strategy usage during these rounds was also
investigated with a RFX-BMS analysis, of which the
results are in the purple bars of Figure 12. This fig-
ure shows that the ToM3 and ToM4 strategies were the
strategies that best explained the largest percentages
of the population, 22.9% and 21.2% of the population
respectively. Interestingly, those participants that were
classified as using a higher order of theory of mind rea-
soning also obtained higher scores on average.
6.2.6 Random order ToM opponent
Figure 11 shows the behavior of the participants during
the rounds where the ToM order of the opponent was
randomly reassigned in each round. The frequencies of
the numbers chosen by the participants can be seen
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 10: Participant (a) choices and (b) rates during
the ToM3 opponent blocks. The green line indicates the
expected outcome of random behavior.
in Figure 11a. This figure illustrates that the behavior
of the participants during these rounds was approxi-
mately random. The rates displayed in Figure 11b show
that the rates during the random order ToM opponent
are distributed differently than the rates in the rounds
against the other opponents. In contrast to the other
blocks, during the random order ToM agent block, there
seemed to be more of a preference to stay on the same
number (a rate of 0). However, a rate of 2 is still the
most frequent one, just as in the other blocks. This fig-
ure also shows that higher rates occurred more often
during these trials as well (e.g. rates of 6, 7 or 8). This
trend was also observed when looking at the individual
data, where it was shown that some of the participants
chose higher rates the most (e.g. rates of 5 or 7).
The results of the RFX-BMS in Figure 12 (red bars)
show that among the ToM strategies, the ToM2 strat-
egy best describes participant behavior. However, when
playing against the randomizing agent, participant be-




Fig. 11: Participant (a) choices and (b) rates during
the random order ToM opponent blocks. The green line
indicates the expected outcome of random behavior.
Figure 12 also shows that, unlike when participants
play against the ToM0, ToM1, or ToM2 agent, partic-
ipant behavior against the random ToM opponent is
better explained by behavior-based strategies than it is
by theory of mind strategies. While a sizable proportion
of the population is still estimated to use second-order
theory of mind, the other-regarding and win-stay-lost-
shift strategies are estimated to account for more than
20% of the population each.
These results indicate that it was very hard for par-
ticipants to decide on a strategy that led to many wins
against this opponent. The performance during these
trials was very low and the rates deviate from the rates
during the trials in which the ToM order of the agent
was fixed. Note, however, that the participants were
not outsmarted by the random order ToM opponent.
When playing against this opponent, both players ob-
tained low scores.
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Fig. 12: Estimated strategy use of participants in the Mod game across the four different opponent types.
7 General discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we aim to determine (1) to what extent
participants use theory of mind reasoning when playing
against artificial agents, as well as (2) to what extent
artificial agents can encourage the use of higher-order
theory of mind by participants. We do so by letting
participants play the Mod game [9,28] against artificial
theory of mind agents.
In our experiment, a large proportion of partici-
pants playing the Mod game against theory of mind
agents is best described as making use of higher or-
ders of theory of mind. Participants that faced a first-
order theory of mind agent relied mostly on first-order
or second-order theory of mind themselves, while par-
ticipants that played against a third-order theory of
mind agent were better described as using third-order
or fourth-order theory of mind. Moreover, these theory
of mind strategies were found to describe participant
behavior better than simpler behavior-based strategies,
such as always choosing the number that is 2 higher
than your previous action. However, when playing the
Mod game against a randomizing agent, who randomly
selected to play as if it were a first-order, second-order,
or third-order at the start of each round, participants
were better described as relying on such simpler behavior-
based strategies.
In strategic games, participants are typically found
to rely on low orders of theory of mind, and to be slow
to adjust their level of theory of mind reasoning to more
sophisticated opponents [11,3,32,10]. Earlier empirical
research suggests that the use of first-order and second-
order theory of mind in games can be facilitated by
creating a believable story or insightful visual repre-
sentation around an abstract problem [5], by creating
a clear competition or negotiation setting [10,31], or
by providing stepwise training from games that require
zero-order ToM to second-order ToM games, as we did
in [25].
Our results in the Mod game suggest that partici-
pants even make use of an unprecedented fourth-order
theory of mind reasoning when playing against a higher-
order theory of mind opponent in the Mod game, even
though they only faced each opponent for twenty con-
secutive rounds of play. Moreover, participants that were
classified as using higher orders of theory of mind tended
to obtain higher scores. In future work, it would be in-
teresting to determine to what extent participants ex-
hibit the same behavior when facing more than one
opponent at the same time (i.e., for n > 2).
Additionally, our results in the Mod game show higher
levels of theory of mind reasoning than results of simi-
lar experiments with the matching pennies game [27,5].
One possible explanation is that adults in the match-
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ing pennies experiment did not have enough time to
engage in higher-order theory of mind reasoning. In
our Mod game experiment, participants took an aver-
age 3700 ms to respond in rounds where they faced the
least sophisticated opponent. In contrast, participants
in the matching pennies experiment were given 1300
ms to make a decision. Given this time pressure, par-
ticipants may have decided to rely on simple behavior-
based strategies.
Alternatively, although the Mod game is arguably
more difficult than matching pennies, it is easier to dis-
tinguish strategies from one another in the Mod game
than in matching pennies. In matching pennies, play-
ers only have two possible actions to choose from. As a
result, the choice of a particular action gives little in-
formation about the underlying strategy. In our Mod
game experiment, however, there are 24 possible ac-
tions, which allows players to more easily interpret the
actions of their opponent and draw conclusions about
the underlying strategy. In addition, participants were
informed about the abilities of their artificial oppo-
nents, which may have helped them to identify observed
behavior of the opponent.
The unexpectedly high level of theory of mind rea-
soning of participants can also be partially explained
by the representation of the game. In our definition
of theory of mind agents, zero-order theory of mind
agents reason about opponent actions. However, this
ignores the experimental setting that participants were
confronted with, in which actions are meaningfully ar-
ranged in a circle. This may encourage people to think
about the game in terms of the change of action (i.e.
rate) rather than the specific choices that were made. A
zero-order theory of mind agent that thinks in terms of
rates rather than choices would exhibit behavior similar
to first-order theory of mind agents that think in terms
of choices. That is, the representation of the zero-order
theory of mind model is important in determining at
which order of theory of mind participants are reason-
ing [17].
Theory of mind plays a fundamental role in many
social skills, and especially communication. Using a com-
bination of language, prosody, body language, and ges-
tures, the speaker attempts to find the best way to
convey a certain meaning to the hearer. Meanwhile,
the hearer tries to find the best interpretation for a
given utterance. For efficient communication, an accu-
rate estimation of the other’s level of theory of mind
reasoning is vital. In this paper, we have shown that
the use of artificial theory of mind agents provides a
modality-independent way of obtaining such an esti-
mate. In future research, it would be interesting to see
whether robots using multi-modal communication are
more effective than software agents at enticing people
to employ higher orders of theory of mind.
Conclusion
In our experiment, participants that played the Mod
game against virtual agents capable of higher orders
of theory of mind reasoning were estimated to engage
in higher-order theory of mind reasoning themselves as
well. This suggests that artificial agents can indeed en-
courage people to make use of higher-order social cogni-
tion and allow them to achieve better results. It would
be valuable to extend this training approach using vir-
tual theory of mind agents to other settings, such as co-
operative games and coordination situations, in which
being able to apply higher orders of theory of mind
would also be beneficial for people.
Some existent virtual agents train people in social
skills for which both first- and second-order theory of
mind would be very important, such as training poten-
tial victims of doorstep scams to assess whether a scam
is being attempted [16] and training police agents to
avoid false confessions from suspects in an interroga-
tion [2]. For such virtual training agents, it would be
very useful to integrate our artificial agents’ capabili-
ties. Then the virtual training agents can both assess
participants’ levels of theory of mind and train them
in using second-order theory of mind in adversarial sit-
uations. This will enable participants to apply useful
complex reasoning, as in: “What does the person on
the doorstep intend me to believe?” and “Could I have
accidentally communicated something to the suspect
that he should not know that I know?”
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